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Abstract
Since John Taylor’s (1993) seminal paper, a large literature has argued
that active interest rate feedback rules, that is, rules that respond to in-
creases in inﬂation with a more than one-for-one increase in the nominal
interest rate, are stabilizing. In this paper, we argue that once the zero
bound on nominal interest rates is taken into account, active interest-rate
feedback rules can easily lead to unexpected consequences. Speciﬁcally,
in the context of a sticky-price model, we show that even if the steady
state at which monetary policy is active is locally the unique equilib-
rium, typically there exists an inﬁnite number of equilibrium trajectories
originating arbitrarily close to that steady state that converge either to
another steady state at which monetary policy is passive or to a stable
limit cycle around the active steady state. We conclude that the use of
local techniques for monetary policy evaluation might lead to spurious
policy recommendations.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: E52, E31, E63.
Keywords: Interest rate feedback rules, zero bound on nominal rates,
liquidity traps, multiple equilibria.
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Since John Taylor’s (1993) seminal paper describing Federal Reserve policy,
there has been a resurgence ofinterest in monetary policies that target the
nominal rate. Much ofthe literature has explored the eﬃciency and dynamic
eﬀects ofsuch policies, with particular attention to their stabilization properties.
A central policy recommendation that has emerged from this body of research
is that “active monetary policy,” that is, a policy that strongly responds to
the rate ofinﬂation in setting the nominal interest rate, is stabilizing. 1 In an
earlier paper (Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 1998) we argue that such
result depends very much on the speciﬁcation ofthe model, and that indeed
often active monetary feedback policies lead to multiple equilibria under stan-
dard speciﬁcations, assumptions and calibrations, including models with sticky
prices, Taylor rules that allow for leads or lags, and Ricardian and non-Ricardian
monetary/ﬁscal regimes. In this paper, we take an even stronger position and
argue that active monetary policy generally leads to indeterminacy and multi-
ple equilibria, and that pursuing such a policy can easily lead to unexpected
consequences even in the simplest and most innocuous monetary models, using
the simplest and most standard assumptions.
Our method of analysis departs from the conventional local approach to
study multiple equilibria that proceeds by linearizing around a steady state. The
reason for this departure stems from the observation that the nominal rate must
be constrained to be non-negative, since negative nominal rates are impossible.
It immediately follows from this observation, as we illustrate below, that if
there is a steady state with an active monetary policy, there must necessarily
exist another steady state with a passive policy. As a result, local analysis is
inadequate because paths of the economy diverging from one steady state can
converge to the other steady state or to another attracting set, thus qualifying as
equilibrium trajectories. We show these results in the context ofa sticky-price
model both theoretically and through simulations ofcalibrated economies.
To intuitively illustrate the source ofmultiplicity, consider the Fisher equa-
tion
R(π)=r + π,
where R(π) is a simpliﬁed Taylor rule that sets the nominal rate, R(π), as a non-
decreasing function of inﬂation, r is the discount rate, and π is the inﬂation rate.
This steady-state relation is common to a wide range ofmonetary models with
representative agents and an inﬁnite horizon and holds irrespective ofwhether
prices are ﬂexible or sticky or ofwhether money enters the model through the
utility function, the production function or a cash-in-advance constraint. If
there exists a steady state with active monetary policy, that is, a value of π
1For papers arriving at this conclusion in the context of non-optimizing models, see Levin,
Wieland, and Williams (1998) and Taylor (1998a, 1998b); for optimizing models with ﬂexible
prices, see Leeper (1991); and for optimizing models with nominal frictions see Rotemberg and













Figure 1: Taylor Rules, zero-bound on nominal rates, and multiple steady states
that solves the Fisher equation and satisﬁes R(π) > 1,t h e ni fR(π) ≥ 0 and
continuous, there must exist another steady state with R(π) < 1 (Figure 1).2
Since the inﬂation rate π is a jump variable whose initial value is not exoge-
nously given, the existence ofa steady state with active policies immediately
establishes the possibility ofthe existence ofat least two steady state equilibria.
Clearly, the existence ofmultiple solutions to the steady-state Fisher equation
need not imply the existence ofmultiple steady-state equilibria, f or in general
the equilibrium conditions will involve other equations. However, in this paper
we show, in the context ofa standard model with nominal rigidities, that in
general the presence ofa steady state equilibrium at which monetary policy is
active gives rise to at least one other steady-state equilibrium at which monetary
policy is passive.
But it would be naive to conclude that active interest-rate rules are desta-
bilizing solely because they give rise to multiple steady-state equilibria. After
all, the observed inﬂation dynamics do not seem to be consistent with an econ-
omy in which inﬂation constantly jumps from a level at which monetary policy
is active to another at which monetary policy is passive. The main result of
this paper is that active Taylor rules are destabilizing because the multiplicity
ofsteady-equilibria that they induce opens the door to a much larger class of
equilibria. Speciﬁcally, we show that in general there exists an inﬁnite number
2Note that for the existence of two solutions to the steady-state Fisher equation it is not
crucial that the Taylor rule be continuous. It is suﬃcient that the Taylor rule is non-negative,
non-decreasing and that one solution occurs at a value of π for which R(π) > 1.T h eb o t t o m
right panel of Figure 1 displays a case in which there is a unique solution to the Fisher equation
even though at that solution R(π) > 1. The absence of a second solution results not because
the Taylor rule is discontinuous but because it is non-monotonic. We will not explore the
macroeconomic consequences of Taylor rules of this type because we believe that they are
irrelevant for it is implausible that the central bank will implement a discrete increase in the
nominal interest rate in the context of declining inﬂation.
2ofequilibrium trajectories originating in the vicinity ofthe active steady state
that converge either to the steady state at which monetary policy is passive
(a saddle connection) or to a stable limit cycle around the active steady state.
Interestingly, along both the saddle connection and the limit cycle, the inﬂation
rate ﬂuctuates for long periods of time around the steady state at which mone-
tary policy is active. Thus, an econometrician using data generated from such
equilibria to estimate the slope ofthe Taylor rule may very well conclude that
monetary policy has always been active.
Simulations ofcalibrated versions ofthe model indicate that saddle connec-
tions from the active steady state to the passive steady state exist for empirically
plausible parameterizations and are indeed the most typical pattern as they are
robust to wide parameter perturbations. This type ofequilibrium is ofparticu-
lar interest because it sheds light on the precise way in which economies may fall
into liquidity traps. The results suggest that central banks that maintain an ac-
tive monetary policy stance near a given inﬂation target are more likely to lead
the economy into a deﬂationary spiral–like the one currently observed in Japan
and, as some may argue, in the United States–than central banks that main-
tain a globally passive monetary stance such as an interest- or exchange-rate
peg.
2 A Sticky-Price Model
The economy is assumed to be populated by a continuum ofhousehold—ﬁrm
units indexed by j each ofwhich produces a diﬀerentiated good Y j. Firms have
market power and set prices so as to maximize proﬁts. The demand faced by
ﬁrm j is given by Y dd(Pj/P),w h e r eY d denotes the level ofaggregate demand,
Pj the price ﬁrm j charges for the good it produces, and P the aggregate price
level. Such a demand function can be derived by assuming that households
have preferences over a composite good that is produced from diﬀerentiated
intermediate goods via a Dixit-Stiglitz production function. The function d(·)
i sa s s u m e dt os a t i s fy d(1) = 1 and d(1) < −1. The restriction imposed on d(1)
is necessary for the ﬁrm’s problem to be well deﬁned in a symmetric equilibrium.
The production ofgood j uses labor hj provided by the household j as the only
input:
Y j = y(hj)
where y(·) is positive, strictly increasing, strictly concave and satisﬁes the Inada
conditions.
We introduce nominal price rigidity, following Rotemberg (1982), by as-
suming that households face convex costs of adjusting prices. Speciﬁcally, the














3where cj denotes consumption ofthe composite good by household j, mj ≡
Mj/P denotes real money balances held by household j,a n dMj denotes nom-
inal money balances. The utility function u(·,·) is assumed to be strictly in-
creasing and strictly concave, and satisﬁes ucc − ucmuc/um < 0 and umm −
ucmum/uc < 0, which ensures that both real balances and consumption are
normal goods. The function z(·) measures the disutility oflabor and is assumed
to be convex. The parameter γ measures the degree to which household—ﬁrm
units dislike to deviate in their price-setting behavior from the constant rate of
inﬂation π∗ > −r.
The household’s instant budget constraint and no-Ponzi-game restriction are
˙ aj =( R − π)aj − Rmj +
Pj
P





0[R(s)−π(s)]dsaj(t) ≥ 0, (3)
where a denotes the real value ofthe household’s ﬁnancial assets which consist
ofmoney holdings and government bonds, R denotes the nominal interest rate,
π the rate ofchange in the aggregate price level, and τ denotes real lump-sum
taxes. In addition, ﬁrms are subject to the constraint that given the price they







The household chooses sequences for cj, mj, Pj ≥ 0,a n daj so as to maxi-
mize (1) subject to (2)—(4) taking as given aj(0), Pj(0),a n dt h et i m ep a t h s
































where πj ≡ ˙ Pj/P j.
4Monetary and Fiscal Policy
The monetary authority is assumed to set the nominal interest rate as an in-
creasing function of the inﬂation rate. Speciﬁcally, it conducts open market
operations so as to ensure that
R = R(π) ≡ R∗e
A
R∗ (π−π∗) (11)
where R∗, A,a n dπ∗ are positive constants.3 This speciﬁcation ofthe f eed-
back rule implies that the nominal interest rate is strictly positive and strictly
increasing in the inﬂation rate. We will refer to monetary policy as active
(passive) ifthe monetary authority raises the nominal interest rate by more
(less) than one-for-one in response to an increase in the inﬂation rate, that is,
if R(π) > (<)1.
The instant budget constraint ofthe government is given by
˙ a =( R − π)a − Rm − τ, (12)
where a denotes the real value ofaggregate per capita government liabilities,
which consist ofreal balances and bonds. The monetary-ﬁscal regime is assumed
to be Ricardian in the sense ofBenhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1998). That
is, the monetary-ﬁscal regime ensures that total government liabilities converge
to zero in present discounted value for all (equilibrium or oﬀ-equilibrium) paths






In a symmetric equilibrium all household—ﬁrm units choose identical sequences
for consumption, asset holdings, and prices. Thus, we can drop the superscript
j.I na d d i t i o n ,t h eg o o d sm a r k e tm u s tc l e a r ,t h a ti s ,
c = y(h). (14)
Combining equations (5) and (6) yields a liquidity preference function of the
form
m = m(c,R). (15)
Given our maintained assumption about the normality ofconsumption and real
balances, the demand for money is increasing in consumption and decreasing in
3Note that we assume that the constant π∗ appearing in the interest rate feedback rule is
the same constant that plays a role in the household’s cost of adjusting prices. We make this
assumption for analytical convenience.
4As discussed in Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1998), an example of a Ricardian
monetary-ﬁscal regime is an interest-rate feedback rule like (11) in combination with the ﬁscal
rule τ + Rm = αa; α>0. In the case in which α = R, this ﬁscal rule corresponds to a
balanced-budget requirement.
5the nominal interest rate. Using (11), (14), and (15) to eliminate R, c,a n dm
from (5) yields the following expression for h:
h = h(λ,π), (16)
where hλ < 0, hπucm < 0 if ucm =0 ,a n dhπ =0if ucm =0 .5
Let η ≡ d(1) < −1 denote the equilibrium price elasticity ofthe demand
function faced by the individual ﬁrm. Using (7), (11), and (16) to eliminate µ,
R,a n dh from equations (8) and (9) yields
˙ λ = λ[r + π − R(π)] (17)









A perfect-foresight equilibrium is a pair of sequences {λ,π} satisfying (17)
and (18). Given the equilibrium sequences {λ,π}, the corresponding equilib-
rium sequences {h,c,R,m} are uniquely determined by (16), (14), (11), and
(15), respectively. The assumed Ricardian nature ofthe monetary-ﬁscal regime
requires that the ﬁscal authority sets taxes in such a way that, given paths for
R, π,a n dm and an initial condition a(0), the path for a implied by equation
(12) satisﬁes the transversality condition (13).
3 Steady-state equilibria
A steady-state equilibrium is deﬁned as a pair ofconstant sequences {λ,π}
satisfying equations (17) and (18); that is,
0=r + π − R∗e
A
R∗ (π−π∗) (19)









Recalling that R∗ = r + π∗, it is clear from (19) that in general there exist two
steady-state levels ofinﬂation, π∗ and ¯ π,w i t h¯ π<(>)π∗ if A>(<)1.I fA =1 ,
then π∗ is the unique steady-state level ofinﬂation. Note that if A>1,t h e n
monetary policy is active at π∗ and passive at ¯ π. Conversely, if A<1, monetary
policy is passive at π∗ and active at ¯ π.
The steady-state level of λ associated with π∗, λ







5To see this, note that hλ =[ umm − (um/uc)ucm]/[y(uccumm − u2
cm)].T h e a s s u m e d
concavity of the instant utility function and normality of consumption imply, respectively,
that the denominator of this expression is positive and that the numerator is negative. Also,
hπ = −hλucmmRR(π), which is of the opposite sign of ucm.
6Because the right-hand side ofthis expression is positive and decreasing in λ,
λ










(π∗ − ¯ π)
y(h(λ, ¯ π))
.
If A<1,t h e nπ∗ − ¯ π<0 and hence the right-hand side ofthis expression is
decreasing in λ. Therefore, if a steady-state value of λ exists, it is unique. On
the other hand, if A>1,t h e nπ∗ − ¯ π>0 and the right-hand side ofthe above
expression may not be monotone in λ. Thus, multiple steady-state values of λ
may exist.
4 Local equilibria
We now consider perfect-foresight equilibria in which λ and π remain bounded
in a small neighborhood around the steady state (λ
∗,π ∗) and converge asymp-
totically to it.
Linearizing equations (17) and (18) around (λ







































T h es i g no ft h ec o e ﬃ c i e n tJ22 depends on the sign of hπ,w h i c hi nt u r nd e -
pends on whether consumption and real balances are Edgeworth substitutes or
complements. Speciﬁcally, J22 is positive if ucm ≥ 0, and may be negative if
ucm < 0.6
Ifmonetary policy is active at π∗ (A>1), then the determinant of J is
positive, so that the real part ofthe roots of J have the same sign. Since
both λ and π are jump variables, the equilibrium is locally determinate ifand
only ifthe trace of J is positive. It follows that if ucm ≥ 0, the equilibrium
6An aggregate supply schedule like the one given by the second row of (21) also arises in the
context of a staggered price setting model with optimizing ﬁrms like Yun’s (1996) extension
of Calvo (1983). In Calvo’s original model, ﬁrms change prices according to a rule of thumb
that results in an aggregate supply function in which ˙ π is only a function of aggregate demand
(J22 =0 ).
7is locally determinate. If ucm < 0, the equilibrium may be locally determinate
or indeterminate.7 Ifmonetary policy is passive at π∗,( A<1), then the
determinant of J is negative, so that the real part ofthe roots of J are of
opposite sign. In this case, the equilibrium is locally indeterminate.
One may be tempted to conclude from the above analysis that if ucm ≥ 0,
there is no indeterminacy problem under active monetary policy. This conclu-
sion is incorrect, however, because globally the picture may be quite diﬀerent.
5 Global equilibria
In order to characterize global equilibrium dynamics, in this section, we assume
particular functional forms for preferences and technology. We assume that the
instant utility function displays constant relative risk aversion in a composite
good, which in turn is produced with consumption goods and real balances via
a CES aggregator. Formally,
u(c,m) − z(h)=









; q,w ≤ 1,v>0 (22)
The restrictions imposed on q and w ensure that u(·,·) is concave, c and m are
normal goods, and the interest elasticity ofmoney demand is strictly negative. 8
The production function takes the form
y(h)=hα;0 <α<1
In the recent related literature on determinacy ofequilibrium under alter-
native speciﬁcations of Taylor rules, it is typically assumed that preferences are
separable in consumption and real balances (e.g., Woodford, 1996; Bernanke
and Woodford, 1997; Clarida, Galí, and Gertler, 1997). We therefore charac-
terize the equilibrium under this preference speciﬁcation ﬁrst, before turning to
the more general case.
5.1 Separable preferences
The case of separable preferences arises when the intra- and intertemporal elas-
ticities ofsubstitution take the same value, that is, when q = w. In this case
the equilibrium conditions (17) and (18) become
˙ λ = λ















7Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1998) show that the economy with ucm < 0 is similar
to one without money in the utility function but money entering the production function.
8Note that the sign of ucm equals the sign of w − q.
8where β ≡ (1 + v)/(α(w − 1)) < 0, ω ≡ w/(w − 1),a n dθ ≡ 1/(α(1 − w)).
Throughout this subsection we assume that
R∗ = r + π∗.
This expression implies that π∗ solves (23) when ˙ λ =0 . Evaluating (24) at










Evaluating (24) at π =¯ π and setting ˙ π =0yields the following expression
deﬁning the steady-state value of λ, ¯ λ, associated with ¯ π
r(¯ π − π∗)=M(¯ λ
ω − ¯ λ
β).
Because ¯ π<π ∗ for A>1 and ω ≥ 0 for w ≤ 0, it follows from this expression
that if A>1 and w ≤ 0,t h e n¯ λ exists and is unique.9 Thus, in this subsection
we assume that w ≤ 0; that is, the intertemporal elasticity ofsubstitution does
not exceed unity.
The main result ofthis subsection is that in the economy described above
there exists an inﬁnite number ofequilibrium trajectories originating arbitrarily
close to the steady state at which monetary policy is active that converge either
to the steady state at which monetary policy is passive or to a limit cycle. In
section 4, we showed that ifone restricts the analysis to equilibria in which π
and λ remain forever bounded in an arbitrarily small neighborhood of the active
steady state, then the unique perfect-foresight equilibrium is the steady state
itself. Thus, the picture that arises from a local analysis might wrongly lead
one to conclude that active monetary policy is stabilizing when in fact it is not.
The following proposition formalizes this result.
Proposition 1 (Global indeterminacy under active monetary policy
and separable preferences) Suppose preferences are separable in consump-
tion and real balances (q = w). Then, for r and A − 1 positive and suﬃciently
small, the equilibrium exhibits indeterminacy as follows: trajectories originating
in the neighborhood of the steady state (λ,π)=( λ
∗,π∗), at which monetary pol-
icy is active, converge either to the other steady state, (¯ λ, ¯ π), at which monetary
policy is passive or to a limit cycle around (λ
∗,π∗). In the ﬁrst case, there exists
a saddle connection and the dimension of indeterminacy is one, whereas in the
latter case the dimension of indeterminacy is two.
Proof: See the Appendix.
This result is likely to also arise in models with alternative speciﬁcations
ofthe source ofnominal rigidities. For example, in a model with staggered
9If w =0 , ¯ λ may not exist for all parameterizations of the model. For r suﬃciently close
to zero or A suﬃciently close to one (or both), ¯ λ always exists.
9price setting like Yun’s (1996) extension ofCalvo (1983), the aggregate supply
schedule takes a form that is qualitatively similar to (24). Thus, we conjecture
that the Calvo-Yun model exhibits global indeterminacy ofthe kind described
in Proposition 1 as well.10
Figure 2 illustrates the existence ofa saddle connection f rom the steady state
at which monetary policy is active to the steady state at which monetary policy
is passive. In computing the equilibrium dynamics of π and λ, the assumed time
unit is a quarter. The parameters R∗, π∗, and r were set at .06/4, .042/4, and
.018/4, respectively. The parameter A was set at 1.5, so that at the active steady
state the Taylor rule has the slope suggested by Taylor (1993). These parameter
values imply that at the active steady state the nominal interest rate is 6 percent
per year, which equals the average three-months Treasury Bill rate in the period
1960:1-1998:9, the inﬂation rate is 4.2 percent per year, which is consistent the
average US inﬂation rate over the period 1960:Q1-1998:Q3 as measured by the
GDP deﬂator, and the real discount rate is 1.8 percent per year. In addition, we
set w = q = −1 so that the instant utility function is separable in consumption
and real balances, and the intertemporal elasticity ofsubstitution equals 1/2.
The parameter x was set at a value consistent with an annual consumption
velocity ofmoney of3. The labor share, α, was set at .7, and the labor supply
elasticity at 1. The value of η was chosen so that the implied markup ofprices
over marginal cost at the active steady state is 5 percent, which is consistent
with the evidence presented by Basu and Fernald (1997). Finally, following
Sbordone (1998), we set γ, the parameter governing the disutility ofdeviating
from the inﬂation target, at −17.5(1 + η). Table 1 summarizes the calibration.
The inﬂation rate at the passive steady state is 0.7 percent per year, and the
Table 1: Calibration
R∗ π∗ rA wq c / m α v
η
1+η γ
.06/4 .042/4 .018/4 1.5 -1 -1 3/4 .7 1 1.05 350
Notes: (1) The time unit is one quarter. (2) x/(1 − x)=( c/m)
1−q/R
∗.
sensitivity ofthe Taylor rule with respect to inﬂation is .63. The active steady
state is a source and the passive steady state is a saddle. Thus, the active steady
state is locally the unique rational expectations equilibrium whereas around the
passive steady state the equilibrium is indeterminate. The solid line in ﬁgure 2
displays the saddle path converging to the passive steady state. The dashed line
corresponds to the unstable manifold diverging from the passive steady state.
Three features of Figure 2 are noteworthy. First, the indeterminacy result
10In Calvo’s (1983) original sticky-price model, the aggregate supply function takes the form
˙ π = f(λ). In this case, the equilibrium conditions (23)-(24) form a conservative Hamiltonian
system whose Jacobian has a zero trace and a positive determinant under active monetary
policy. Such a system gives rise to a continuum of cycles surrounding the active steady state.
These cycles are enclosed by a homoclinic orbit formed by the connection of the stable and
unstable manifolds of the passive steady state. The period of the cycles approaches inﬁnity
as the cycles get closer to the homoclinic orbit.











active steady state: l=1.22, p=0.042
passive steady state: l=1.22, p=0.007
Figure 2: Separable preferences: Saddle connection from the active to the pas-
sive steady state
established in Proposition 1 seems to hold not only for pairs (r, A) close to
(0,1) but also for empirically relevant values. Second, the saddle connection
is not inconsistent with the observation that the inﬂation rate ﬂuctuates for
long periods oftime in a region in which monetary policy is active, as has been
argued is the case ofthe U.S. economy since the Volker era (see Clarida, et
al., 1997; and Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997). In our calibrated economy
monetary policy is active for all inﬂation rates exceeding 2.6 percent per year.
Third, one argument for restricting attention to local dynamics is that observed
inﬂation ﬂuctuations at business-cycle frequencies are relatively small. The
global dynamics illustrated in ﬁgure 2 suggest that the short-term ﬂuctuations
in the inﬂation rate along the saddle connection are empirically plausible, with
a maximum annual inﬂation rate of5.7 percent and a minimum of0.7 percent.
The dynamics are robust to wide variations in parameter values. Figure
3 illustrates that the saddle path connecting the steady state at which mone-
tary policy is active with the steady state at which policy is passive does not
disappear if: (a) A,t h es l o p eo ft h eT a y l o rr u l ea tπ = π∗, is increased from
the baseline value of1.5 to a value of2, which, as some authors may argue,
reﬂects more closely the stance ofU.S. monetary policy in the post-Volker era
(see, again, Clarida, et al., 1997; and Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997); (b) π∗,
the inﬂation rate associated with the active steady state, is set at 3 percent per
year. This case illustrates that the global indeterminacy result does not hinge
in any important way on the inﬂation rate being high at the active steady state.
(Note that the inﬂation rate at the passive steady state is negative.); (c) γ,t h e
parameter governing the cost of deviating from the inﬂation target, is reduced
from its baseline value of 350 to 35. Although not noticeable in the ﬁgure, for
such a low value of γ, the economy converges from the vicinity of the active

















































h/(1+   h) = 1.2
Figure 3: Separable Preferences: Sensitivity analysis
12steady state to the passive steady state at a much higher speed than under the
baseline calibration; (d) the annual consumption velocity ofmoney is increased
fr o m3t o2 0 .T h i sr e s u l ti so f p a r t i c u l a ri n t e r e s ti nl i g h to f t h ev i e wt h a ta sar e -
sult of ﬁnancial innovation agents are increasingly able to perform transactions
without money; (e) The discount rate, r, takes a value of4, a value commonly
used in the real-business-cycle literature (Prescott, 1986); and (f) a markup of
prices over marginal cost of20 percent is assumed. This number reﬂects the
upper range ofavailable empirical estimates (Basu and Fernald, 1997).
5.2 Non-separable preferences
In this subsection, we consider preference speciﬁcations for which the intra- and
intertemporal elasticities of substitution are diﬀerent from each other (q = w).
In this case, the equilibrium conditions (17) and (18) can be written as
˙ λ = λ






































where β and ω are deﬁned as in the previous subsection and χ ≡ q/(q − 1),
ξ ≡ (w−q)/[αq(1−w)] =0 ,a n dθ ≡ w/[αq(1−w)].L e tλ
∗ be the steady-state
value of λ associated with π = π∗, A =1 , r = rc,a n dR∗ = π∗ + rc (with rc to
be determined below). Then, by equation (25) λ



























The parameter rc is deﬁned as the value of r that makes the trace ofthe Jacobian


















13Inspection of(27) reveals that the existence ofa positive rc depends on pa-
rameter values. For example, one can show that a positive rc always exists if
q ∈ (0,1) and q − w,π ∗ > 0. Throughout this subsection, we assume that R∗
is ﬁxed and equal to rc + π∗. When (r, A)=( rc,1),t h ep o i n t(λ,π)=( λ
∗,π∗)
is the unique steady state ofthe system (25)-(25). At that point, monetary
policy is neither active nor passive (R(π∗)=1 ). For parameter conﬁgurations
in which (r, A) =( rc,1), the economy displays in general either none or two
steady-state values of π. When two steady-state values of π exist, the larger of
them corresponds to an active monetary policy stance and the smaller one to
a passive stance. In addition, each steady-state value of π is associated with
one or two steady-state values of λ. The following lemma shows that under
the assumption that the intertemporal elasticity ofsubstitution is less than one
(w<0), each steady-state value of π is associated with a unique steady-state
value of λ. For this reason and because it is clearly the case ofgreatest empirical
relevance, in what follows we assume that w<0. The lemma also shows that
the steady state at which monetary policy is active is either a sink or a source,
while the steady state at which monetary policy is passive is always a saddle.
Lemma 1 Suppose w<0. Then, the steady states of the system (25) and (25)
satisfy: (i) for each steady-state value of π there exists a unique steady-state
value of λ; and (ii) the steady state at which monetary policy is active is either
a sink or a source and the steady state at which monetary policy is passive is
always a saddle.
Proof: See the appendix.
The next proposition contains the main result ofthis subsection. Namely,
that ifthe steady state at which monetary policy is active is locally the unique
equilibrium (i.e., the steady state is a source), then the equilibrium is globally
indeterminate. Speciﬁcally, there exist equilibrium trajectories originating arbi-
trarily close to the steady state at which monetary policy is active that converge
either to a limit cycle or to the other steady state, at which monetary policy is
passive.
Proposition 2 (Global indeterminacy under active monetary policy
and non-separable preferences) For parameter speciﬁcations (r,A) suﬃ-
ciently close to (rc,1), the economy with non-separable preferences exhibits in-
determinacy as follows: There always exist an inﬁnite number of equilibrium
trajectories originating arbitrarily close to the steady state at which monetary
policy is active that converge either to: (i) that steady state; (ii) a limit cycle;
or (iii) the other steady state at which monetary policy is passive. In cases (i)
and (ii) the dimension of indeterminacy is two, whereas in case (iii) it is one.
Proof: See the appendix.
The following corollary establishes parameter restrictions under which at-
tracting limit cycles exist around the steady state at which monetary policy is
active.










active steady state: l=1.21, p=0.042
passive steady state: l=1.21, p=0.007
Figure 4: Non-separable preferences, w>q: saddle connection from the active
to the passive steady state
Corollary 1 (Periodic equilibria) If − 1−B
B(1+v+α) <ξ<0,t h e nt h e r ee x i s t s
a region in the neighborhood of (r, A)=( rc,1) for which the active steady state
is a source surrounded by a stable limit cycle. On the other hand, if ξ>0 or
ξ<− 1−B
B(1+v+α), then stable limit cycles do not exist.
Proof: See the appendix.
It is important to recall that the equilibrium remains globally indeterminate
even iflimit cycles do not exist. This is because in that case there always exists
an equilibrium trajectory connecting the active steady state with the passive
one. In fact, as shown in Figures 4 and 5, a saddle connection is the typical
pattern that arises under plausible parameterizations ofthe model with non-
separable preferences. In both ﬁgures, the calibration is the same as the one
used in the economy with separable preferences, summarized in table 1, ex-
cept, ofcourse, that now the intratemporal elasticity ofsubstitution between
consumption and real balances, 1/(1 − q), is assumed to be diﬀerent from the
intertemporal elasticity ofsubstitution, 1/(1−w). In both ﬁgures, the intertem-
poral elasticity ofsubstitution takes its baseline value of .5.I n F i g u r e 4 , q is
set at -9, a value consistent with an interest elasticity ofmoney demand of-
.1. In this case, w>q , which implies that consumption and real balances are
Edgeworth complements (Ucm > 0).11 In Figure 5, q is set at −0.975,w h i c h
corresponds to a log-log interest elasticity ofmoney demand of 1/2.I n t h i s
case, w<q , so consumption and money are Edgeworth substitutes (Ucm < 0).
Under both parameterizations, the active steady state is locally the unique
11When Ucm > 0, the economy is equivalent to a cash-in-advance economy with cash and
credit goods like the one developed by Lucas and Stokey (1987).











active steady state: l=1.22, p=0.042
passive steady state: l=1.22, p=0.007
Figure 5: Non-separable preferences, w<q: saddle connection from the active
to the passive steady state
perfect-foresight equilibrium (i.e., the active steady state is a source). However,
as the ﬁgures suggest, from a global perspective it is clear that an inﬁnite num-
ber oftrajectories originating arbitrarily close to the active steady state and on
the saddle connection can be supported as equilibrium outcomes because they
converge to the passive steady state.
The pattern illustrated in Figures 4 and 5 is unchanged for values of q
between -.975 and -9, the two values assumed in the ﬁgures. As q is increased
above -.975, the active steady state becomes a sink and thus the equilibrium
is locally indeterminate. If w>q(Ucm > 0), the simulation results are, as in
the case of separable preferences, robust to wide variations in other parameter
values. In particular, a saddle path connecting the active steady state with
the passive one continues to exist for more aggressive Taylor rules (A ≥ 2)
and lower costs of price adjustment (for example, γ =3 5 ). In the case that
q>w(Ucm < 0), parameter variations may or may not eliminate the saddle
connection. However, when the saddle connection disappears, it is typically
replaced by a situation in which the active steady state is a sink, which is
locally a more severe case ofindeterminacy.
6 Final Remarks
This paper shows that in a sticky-price model when a global analysis is under-
taken, the existence ofa steady state with active monetary policy generically
leads to global indeterminacy. Although the prepositions above are proven for
speciﬁc functional forms to facilitate checking for non-degeneracies, it is clear
from the general structure of the equilibrium conditions that generically alterna-
tive speciﬁcations for smooth preferences and the interest rate feedback rule will
16give rise to similar results, as long as the feedback rule assures the existence of a
steady state with an active monetary policy. The main results ofthe paper also
obtain in ﬂexible-price versions ofthe model (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 1998).
In this case, equilibrium dynamics are described by a scalar system where again
a continuous feedback rule generating a steady state with active monetary pol-
icy implies the existence of a passive steady state, with all the implications for
global indeterminacy, quite independently of the structure of preferences and
production.
17Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Preliminaries
To prove Proposition 1 we apply the following theorem due to Kopell and
Howard (1975):
Theorem (Kopell and Howard, 1975, Theorem 7.1): Let ˙ X = Fµ,ν(X)
be a two-parameter family of ordinary diﬀerential equations on R2, F smooth
in all of its four arguments, such that Fµ,ν(0) = 0. Also assume:
1. dF0,0(0) ≡ A has a double zero eigenvalue and a single eigenvector e.
2. The mapping (µ,ν) → (det dFµ,ν(0),tr dFµ,ν(0)) has a nonzero Jacobian
at (µ,ν)=( 0 ,0).
3. Let Q(X,X) be the 2 × 1 vector containing the terms quadratic in the xi
and independent of (µ,ν) in a Taylor series expansion of Fµ,ν(X) around
0.T h e n[dF(0,0)(0),Q(e,e)] has rank 2.
Then: There is a curve f(µ,ν)=0such that if f(µ0,ν0)=0 ,t h e n ˙ X =
Fµ0,ν0(X) has a homoclinic orbit. This one-parameter family of homoclinic or-
bits (in (X,µ,ν) space) is on the boundary of a two-parameter family of periodic
solutions. For all |µ|, |ν| suﬃciently small, if ˙ X = Fµ,ν(X) has neither a ho-
moclinic orbit nor a periodic solution, there is a unique trajectory joining the
critical points.
To apply this theorem, we must ﬁrst perform several changes of variables
and a Taylor series expansion ofthe equilibrium conditions around the steady
state. Let p ≡ π − π∗ and n ≡ ln(λ/λ
∗). Then the equilibrium conditions (23)
and (24) can be expressed as
˙ n = R∗ + p − R∗e(
A
R∗)p (28)






Deﬁning y = p/[M(β − ω)] and s = R∗n,w eh a v e
˙ s = R∗2 + M(β − ω)R∗y − R∗2e
A
R∗ M(β−ω)y
˙ y = ry +( e
β
R∗ s − e
ω
R∗ s)/(β − ω)
We now take a Taylor series expansion ofthese two equations around (s,y)=
(0,0), which yields





3!R∗ y3 − ... (30)




























when r =( 1− A)=0 . We are now ready prove Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 1:
We prove the proposition by showing that for (r, 1−A) small enough, the system
ofdiﬀerential equations (30)-(31) satisﬁes the hypotheses ofthe Kopell-Howard
Theorem stated above. Let µ ≡ r, ν ≡ 1 − A,a n dX ≡ [s; y]. Then, the
system (30)-(31) can be expressed as ˙ X = Fµ,ν(X).W eh a v et h a tdF0,0(0) =
[0 0;1/R∗ 0]. Clearly, dF0,0 has a double zero eigenvalue and a single eigenvec-
tor e =[ 0;1 ] . The Jacobian ofthe mapping (µ,ν) → (det dFµ,ν(0),tr dFµ,ν(0))
at (µ,ν)=( 0 ,0) is given by [0 −M(β−ω); 1 0] and is diﬀerent from zero.
Note that neither λ
∗ nor M depend on µ or ν. The vector Q(e,e) is given by
[−M2(β −ω)2/2;0]. It follows that [dF0,0(0) Q(e,e)] has rank 2. The propo-
sition follows from the facts that the active steady state is a source, the passive
steady state is a saddle, and both s and y are jump variables.
Proof of Lemma 1
(i) w<0 implies that ω>0. Given a steady-state value ¯ π the uniqueness ofthe
associated steady-state value of λ follows directly from evaluating (25) at ˙ π =0
and π =¯ π and recalling that β,1+η<0. (ii) By deﬁnition, monetary policy is




Let J denote the Jacobian of(25)-(25). Then J11 =0 . Therefore, the deter-






which is negative (positive) ifmonetary policy is active (passive). The element





























R∗ χ(¯ π−π∗) +1
(1+v)ξ
,
which is clearly positive. Therefore, the determinant of J is positive (negative)
ifand only ifmonetary policy is active (passive).
19Proof of Proposition 2
We prove the proposition by applying a theorem and a lemma from Kuznetsov
(1995) that together allow us to transform the system of equilibrium conditions
into a simpler, topologically equivalent planar system ofdiﬀerential equations
with known bifurcation diagram. Technically, we show that the system (25)-(25)
exhibits a Bogdanov-Takens (double-zero) bifurcation at (r, A)=( rc,1).
Preliminaries
Let n ≡ ln(λ/λ
∗) and y ≡ (π − π∗)/[M(β − ω)]. Then, equilibrium conditions
(25) and (25) can be written as

















R∗ χM(β−ω)y +1− B
(1+v)ξ
˙ n = r + π∗ + M(β − ω)y − R∗e
A
R∗ M(β−ω)y. (33)
Taking a Taylor series expansion ofthe right-hand side ofthis system around





R∗χM(1 + v − α)














R∗χM[β(1 + v) − ωα]yn +
1
2
(β + ω)n2 + ...








y2 − ... (35)
The Jacobian ofthis system is

r + Bξ A
R∗χM(1 + v − α)1
M(β − ω)(1 − A)0

,






which has two zero eigenvalues (the Bogdanov-Takens condition). We now state
the aforementioned theorem and lemma from Kuznetsov (1995).
Theorem (Normal form representation [Kuznetsov, 1995, Theorem
8.4]): Suppose that a planar system
˙ x = f(x,α),x ∈ R2,α ∈ R2,
20with smooth f, has at α =0the equilibrium x =0with a double zero eigenvalue.
Via a Taylor series expansion around x =0and transformation of variables,
this system can be expressed as:









2 + P1 (y,α)









2 + P2 (y,α),
where alk (α), blk (α),a n dP1,2 (y,α)=O( y )3 are smooth functions of their
arguments. Assume that
a00 (0) = a10 (0) = a01 (0) = b00 (0) = b10 (0) = b01 (0) = 0
and that the following nondegeneracy conditions are satisﬁed:
(BT.0) the Jacobian matrix A(0) =
∂f
∂x(0,0) =0 ;
(BT.1) a20(0) + b11(0) =0 ;














is regular at point (x,α)=( 0 ,0).
Then there exist smooth invertible variable transformations smoothly de-
pending on the parameters, a direction-preserving time reparameterization, and
smooth invertible parameter changes, which together reduce the system to

˙ η1 = η2
˙ η2 = β1 + β2η1 + η2
1 + sη1η2 + O( η 3) ,
where s = sign[b20(0)(a20(0) + b11(0))] = ±1.
The explicit steps of the transformation of variables is given in Kuznetsov
(1995). We note that β1 and β2 are functions of α satisfying β1 (α)=β2 (α)=0
for α =0 .
Lemma (Eﬀect of higher-order terms [Kuznetsov, 1995, Lemma 8.8]):
The system

˙ η1 = η2
˙ η2 = β1 + β2η1 + η2
1 ± η1η2 + O( η 3)
is locally topologically equivalent near the origin to the system

˙ η1 = η2
˙ η2 = β1 + β2η1 + η2
1 ± η1η2
.
We are now ready to prove Proposition 2.
21Proof of proposition 2:
We ﬁrst show that the system (25)-(25) ofequilibrium conditions ofthe economy
with non-separable preferences is in general locally (i.e., near (r, A)=( rc,1))
topologically equivalent near the steady state (λ,π)=( λ
∗,π∗) to the system

˙ η1 = η2
˙ η2 = β1 + β2η1 + η2
1 ± η1η2. (36)
The ﬁrst step is to show that the conditions ofTheorem 8.4 ofKuznetsov (1995)
are satisﬁed by the transformation of (25)-(25) given by (32)-(33). Let x ≡ (y, n)
and α ≡ (1 − A,r − rc). Then the system (32)-(33) can be expressed as ˙ x =
f(x,α). We have shown above that (32)-(33) has at α =0the equilibrium x =0
with a non-zero Jacobian. Thus, BT.0 is satisﬁed. We have also shown that
at (x,α)=( 0 ,0) the Jacobian has a double zero eigenvalue. It is clear from
(??)-(34) that
a00 (0) = a10 (0) = a01 (0) = b00 (0) = b10 (0) = b01 (0) = 0.





(1 + v − α)(1 − B)+Bξ((1 + v)2 − α2)

and b20(0) = −R∗[1/R∗M(β − ω)]2 are in general non-zero while b11(0) = 0.






















where a11(0) = BξχMR∗−1[β(1 + v) − ωα]. The determinant ofthis Jacobian
is equal to −b20(0)rc, which is in general diﬀerent from zero, so that the map
is regular at (x, α)=( 0 , 0) and condition BT.3 is satisﬁed. The claim that
the equilibrium conditions have the normal form representation given by (36)
follows from the theorem and the lemma stated above. Proposition 2 then
follows directly from Lemma 1 and the properties of the the bifurcation diagram
of(36) (see Kuznetsov, 1995, section 8.4.2 f or the case in which the coeﬃcient
on η1η2 is −1 and Guckenheimer and Holmes, 1983, section 7.3 for the case in
which the coeﬃcient on η1η2 is +1).
Proof of Corollary 1
The existence ofstable limit cycles depends on the sign ofthe coeﬃcient of
η1η2 in (36), which is equal to the sign ofthe parameter s deﬁned in Theorem
8.4 ofKuznetsov (1995) stated above. As shown in Kuznetsov (1995), if s is
negative there exists a region in the vicinity of (r,A)=( rc,1) for which stable
limit cycles emerge. If s is positive, then stable limit cycles do not exist. In
22the economy with non-separable preferences, s = −sign(a20(0)),w h e r ea20(0)
is given in terms ofthe structural parameters ofthe economy in the proofof
Proposition 2.
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